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Abstract 
The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union (EU) is considered to be one of the (few) 
successful experiments of international democracy promotion. By contrast, the EU’s 
transformative power appears to be weak or non-existent vis-à-vis its (old) neighbours in the 
South and its (new) neighbours in the East. Both are not only marked by “bad governance” but 
also lack a (credible) membership perspective. While the Western Balkans and Turkey have 
made significant progress towards good governance, both with regard to effectiveness and 
democratic legitimacy, the European Neighbourhood Countries (ENC) appear to be stuck in 
transition or never got that far in the first place. Most have improved the effectiveness of 
governance institutions, but their democratic quality is still wanting or even in decline. This 
paper explores whether a membership perspective could turn around the negative trend in the 
EU’s neighbourhood of more statehood and less democracy, and if not, to what extent the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) provides an alternative. We will argue that the 
transformative effect of accession conditionality is still unclear. The prospects of EU 
membership stabilize rather than drive the move towards effective and democratic governance 
in candidate countries. Even if the ENC received a membership perspective, it would be unlikely 
to push them towards democracy. The ENP may lack any transformative power, but still has 
some domestic impact consolidating rather than undermining authoritarian regimes by helping 
to strengthen their capacities for effective governance. 
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1.  Introduction 
Research on the transformative power of Europe is thriving. With the borders of the European 
Union (EU) having moved eastwards, we have been awarded yet another real-world experiment 
on the transformative power of the EU. As in the case of the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC), the EU seeks to transform the domestic structures of its neighbours in order 
to foster peace, stability and prosperity. Turkey and the Western Balkan states have received a 
membership perspective, which, however, increasingly loses its credibility, particularly with 
Turkey. While some of the Western Newly Independent States and the Southern Caucasus 
might foster hopes for being accepted into the club in a distant future, the EU has made it clear 
that all the Mediterranean countries could expect was increasing access without accession. 
Since its Southern and Eastern neighbours lack a (credible) membership perspective, the 
transformative power of the EU seems to be exhausted. Yet, the Western Balkans and Turkey 
have made significant progress towards good governance. The European Neighbourhood 
Countries (ENC), by contrast, appear to be stuck in transition or never made it that far to begin 
with. While most have improved the effectiveness of governance institutions, their democratic 
quality is still wanting or even in decline. 
Against this background, this paper explores whether a membership perspective could turn 
around the negative trend in the EU’s neighbourhood of more statehood and less democracy, 
and if not, to what extent the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) provides an alternative. 
We argue that the transformative effect of accession conditionality is still unclear. The prospects 
of EU membership stabilize rather than drive the move towards effective and democratic 
governance in candidate countries. Even if the ENC received a membership perspective, it 
would be unlikely to push them towards democracy. The ENP may lack any transformative 
power, but still has some domestic impact consolidating rather than undermining authoritarian 
regimes by helping to strengthen their capacities for effective governance. 
The first part of the paper compares the trajectory of the new CEEC member states with the 
Western Balkans and Turkey, which are in the pre-accession stage, as well as the Eastern and 
Southern ENC, which lack a membership perspective. Accession conditionality, somewhat 
ironically, did not make much of a difference in the case of the CEEC, which had already 
acquired a relatively high level of both statehood and democracy when the EU accepted them 
as potential members in 1991. Starting from a much lower level, Turkey and the Western 
Balkans have made significant progress towards both statehood and democracy after the EU 
recognized them as candidate countries in 1999 and 2003, respectively. Yet, this trend had 
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started much earlier. Hence, it is not at all clear whether membership really makes a difference. 
While the domestic change in the CEEC and Turkey had been well under way when the EU put 
out the golden carrot, the Western Balkans had been subject to external attempts of state-
building and democracy promotion by international actors, among which the EU was not the 
only game in town. The EU might be a stabilizing rather than a transforming power. The second 
part of the paper zooms into the ENC to explore the domestic impact of the ENP, which the EU 
has set up as an alternative to accession as to promote good governance. Unlike Turkey and 
the Western Balkans, the Eastern and Southern ENC have on average increased in statehood 
but made no progress or even regressed in democracy. This trend confirms earlier findings of 
the Europeanization literature on the role of the EU in exporting stability rather than promoting 
good governance. At the same time, we find some interesting deviations from this regional trend 
with regard to both the level and magnitude of domestic change that cut across the East-South 
dimension. Algeria and the Ukraine show some improvements with regard to the democratic 
quality of their regimes while the statehood of Moldova, Lebanon and Belarus has declined. If 
the ENP has deployed some domestic impact, its effect is not uniform. In the final part of the 
paper, we argue that these deviations are largely unrelated to the EU but reflect domestic 
developments. The paper concludes with some critical reflections on the EU as a stabilizing 
rather than a transforming power, which is particularly problematic in the case of non-
democratic regimes, which form the vast majority of the EU’s neighbourhood. 
2. Membership matters, but when and how? 
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has sought actively to foster peace, stability and 
prosperity in the post-communist countries by essentially exporting its norms and principles of 
good governance. To make them adopt its constitutional principles and sectoral policies and 
adapt their domestic structures accordingly, the EU has developed a sophisticated tool box that 
heavily draws on ‘reinforcement by reward’ (positive conditionality) and ‘reinforcement by 
support’ (capacity-building) (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; cf. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005). Both instruments are linked in the membership perspective, which is conditional upon 
compliance with the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria and comes with comprehensive financial and 
technical assistance to strengthen the reform capacity of state institutions. The ‘golden carrot’ of 
membership is considered to form the core of the EU’s transformative power, which explains the 
success story of Eastern Enlargement, the differential progress of the Western Balkan countries 
and Turkey as well as the lack of improvement in the European Neighbourhood Countries (inter 
alia Magen 2006; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2009). In the absence of a (credible) 
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membership perspective, the EU is unlikely to have a transformative effect on governance in 
third countries.  
Yet, a comparison of the effectiveness and democratic quality of governance institutions across 
time and countries paints a more ambivalent picture. We still lack reliable data to draw causal 
inferences between the EU’s attempts to transform the domestic structures of accession and 
neighbourhood countries, on the one hand, and changes in the effectiveness and democratic 
quality of their governance institutions, on the other. However, the data available suggest some 
interesting correlations that are supported by the emerging empirical research on Accession 
and Neighbourhood Europeanization. We use the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) Voice and Accountability (VA) and Government Effectiveness (GE) as a proxy 
for democracy and statehood, respectively, to trace changes towards effective and democratic 
governance. Unfortunately, data are only available for the time period of 1998 and 2008.1 But 
they still yield themselves to some interesting observations.  
First, for the CEEC, membership might not have been so important, after all. The 10 CEEC, 
which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, respectively, had reached a relatively high level of 
statehood and democracy when they started negotiating their accession to the EU in 1999. 
Since then, they have not made any significant progress (figure 1 below). Case studies confirm 
that accession conditionality was successful only in the cases of unstable democracies where 
democratic and authoritarian and nationalist forces competed for power. While the prospects of 
membership and the threat to postpone it empowered liberal politics and locked-in democratic 
reforms in Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, the “shadow of accession” has been hardly 
relevant in countries with strong democratic constituencies (most of the CEEC; see Vachudova 
2005; Schimmelfennig 2005). The EU has certainly supported but definitely not driven the 
successful transition of the CEEC (cf. Sadurski 2004; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). 
                                               
1
  While these indicators are certainly no perfect measure of the levels of democracy and statehood in a 
country, they provide a valuable starting point for a systematic comparison across countries and over 
time. Especially indices for statehood are still under development, such as the ‘stateness’ dimension in 
the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), which is only available from 2003 onward. This is why 
we chose the WGI GE, because it highly correlates with the BTI sub-indicator ‘basic administration’, 
capturing the state’s capacity to govern effectively, and it is available since the mid 1990s. 
Accordingly, we opted for the WGI VA among other indices for the democratic quality or the degree of 
political liberalization of regimes, such as the Freedom House Freedom in the World index or Polity IV. 
Even though the WGI are available for 1996-2009, we focus on the ten years between 1998 and 2008 
because of changes in measurement (cf. Kaufmann et al. 2009).  
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Figure 1: Democracy and Statehood in Europe and beyond 
 
Second, Turkey (TR) and the Western Balkans (WB) have made substantial progress since the 
EU recognized them as candidate countries in 1999 and 2003, respectively. While they started 
at a much lower level of both statehood and democracy than the CEEC, they have moved ever 
closer. Similar to the CEEC, EU conditionality has certainly empowered liberal reform coalitions 
in Croatia and Macedonia, the two Western Balkan country that opened accession negotiations, 
Montenegro, which received candidate status, and Serbia, which is about to follow suit. At the 
same time, the Western Balkans have been subject to comprehensive state-building and 
democratization efforts by other external actors, including the UN and NATO, which makes it 
difficult to discern the effect of the EU. Moreover, Albania has been less responsive to EU 
conditionality and assistance resisting necessary reforms to make its governance institutions 
more effective and democratically legitimate (Elbasani 2009) and relapsing in political crisis 
recently. Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, finally, are seriously lagging behind and have not 
even applied for membership (Elbasani 2012). Turkey, by contrast, has continued to make 
progress towards both statehood and democracy despite the declining credibility of its 
membership perspective (Tocci 2005; Saatcioglu 2010). Domestic reforms in Turkey appear to 
be as much endogenously driven as in the CEEC and the Western Balkans. Finally, EU 
conditionality and assistance does not only empower liberal reform coalitions. The governments 
of Turkey and Albania, for instance, have been cherry picking issues from the EU’s reform 
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agenda for good governance that align with their political preferences and help consolidate their 
power (Yilmaz 2011; Elbasani 2009). 
Third, the European Neighbourhood Countries, which lack a membership perspective, have not 
made any significant progress towards good governance.2 Both the seven Arab regimes in the 
Mediterranean and the six former Soviet Republics that form the Eastern Partners of the EU 
have somewhat improved in statehood, but declined in democracy, although only slightly. 
Whether this trend towards more statehood and less democracy is the result of a lacking 
membership perspective, however, is questionable. Conditionality is only an instrument. As long 
as the EU seeks to promote stability rather than democratic change (van Hüllen and Stahn 
2009; Börzel et al. 2008), the prospect to join the EU is unlikely to reverse the regional trend. 
Notwithstanding the question, whether they qualify as “European”, the Southern and Eastern 
ENC would have to make substantial progress towards democracy to meet the Copenhagen 
Criteria if they wanted to obtain a membership perspective in the first place.  
In sum, membership matters but it is unclear whether before or after the EU offers the possibility 
to join. We do not know whether the membership perspective provides the crucial incentive for 
countries to initiate the domestic changes setting the trend towards effective and democratic 
governance or whether these countries only receive a membership perspective once they have 
entered the trend and made substantial progress. The CEEC and Turkey had already significant 
reforms under way, which seems to suggest that the prospects of joining the EU reinforced 
rather than induced domestic changes towards good governance. In the case of the Western 
Balkans, membership has been a means of last resort for the EU after previous attempts at 
state-building and democracy promotion appeared to have failed. Whether the ‘golden carrot’ is 
big enough to overcome domestic resistance against democratic change, on the one hand, and 
come to terms with problems of deficient state capacity and contested statehood remains to be 
seen, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Börzel 2012). 
                                               
2
  Among the countries officially listed by the European Commission as participating in the ENP, we 
focus on six Eastern seven and Southern neighbours: In the East, we include all six ENC in our 
investigation, namely Armenia (ARM), Azerbaijan (AZ), Belarus (BY), Georgia (GE), Moldova (MD), 
and Ukraine (UA). Regarding the Southern ENC, we include Algeria (DZ), Egypt (ET), Jordan (JOR), 
Lebanon (RL), Morocco (MOR), Syria (SYR), and Tunisia (TN) as seven Arab authoritarian regimes 
that have always been integrated into the EU’s Mediterranean policy. We exclude Israel and Palestine, 
because they clearly have a status apart from the other Southern neighbours which is not only due to 
the ongoing Middle East conflict. Israel has much higher levels of socio-economic development and 
democratic quality than the other Mediterranean neighbours and Palestine is simply not yet a state. 
We also exclude Libya, because the EU had sanctions in place until 2004 and since then, the EU and 
Libya have only slowly proceeded in establishing bilateral relations comparable to those with other 
Southern ENC, clearly limiting any impact the EU might have had on domestic change. 
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Since membership is neither in the cards for the European Neighbourhood Countries nor likely 
to make a difference, the question arises whether the new European Neighbourhood Policy 
provides an alternative. To explore these questions, the next section zooms into the European 
Neighbourhood Countries. On average, the seven Arab regimes in the Mediterranean, the three 
Western Newly Independent States and the three Southern Caucasus countries have increased 
in the effectiveness of their governance institutions but stalled or even regressed in their 
democratic quality. At the same time, some of the ENC deviate from this regional trend. 
3. Zooming into the European Neighbourhood: Going against the Tide?  
As we have already seen, the ENC scores of the WGI VA and GE in 1998 and 2008 reveal a 
similar trend throughout the European neighbourhood (figure 1 above): In both the South and 
the East (sub-)regions, a minor decrease of VA and a similar increase in GE over time suggest 
that successful state-building does not go hand in hand with a democratization of the regimes, 
but that the Eastern and Southern neighbours move even further away from the model of liberal 
democracy advocated by the EU. Still, there is a difference between the two (sub-)regions: The 
ENC in the East have, on average, a slightly higher level of democratic quality than the ENC in 
the South, whereas the opposite is the case for the level of statehood, where the Southern ENC 
score higher than the Eastern ENC. However, moving beyond the (sub-)regional level and 
zooming into the individual ENC, these (sub-)regional trends hide significant variation across 
countries, both regarding the initial levels of statehood and democracy and their variation over 
time (figure 2 below).  
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Figure 2: Democracy and Statehood in the European Neighbourhood 
 
 
Focusing on the patterns of change, we identify three groups of ENC: First, countries that are 
perfectly in line with the regional trend, with a decreasing level of democracy and an increasing 
level of statehood; second, those countries that deviate from the regional trend in that both their 
levels of democracy and statehood decrease over time; and third, countries that show progress 
on both dimensions, with increasing levels of democracy and statehood (table 1). Interestingly, 
these trajectories cut across the two (sub-)regions and they are not systematically linked to the 
(initial) levels of democracy and statehood in the individual countries. 
Table 1: Patterns of Change in the ENC 1998-2008 
democracy 
statehood less more 
more Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Syria Algeria, Georgia, Ukraine 
less Belarus, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia -/- 
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The regional trend: Consolidating authoritarian states? 
For Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the change in levels of democracy and 
statehood between 1998 and 2008 reflect the regional average of less democracy and more 
statehood. Except for Jordan, the increase of state capacity is more important than the loss of 
democratic quality. Overall, the magnitude of change in the individual countries is very similar 
so that the variation across countries remains more or less the same over time. Only in Syria 
and Jordan, the change in levels of respectively democracy and statehood is below average, 
which is not surprising, as Syria starts from the lowest level of democratic governance and 
Jordan from the highest level of effective governance among the five to begin with. We see the 
same trajectory at very different (initial) levels and while there seems to be a rough co-variation 
of the levels of democracy and statehood, this is not always the case. Azerbaijan and Syria, for 
instance, have similar levels of statehood but diverging levels of democracy as opposed to 
Azerbaijan and Egypt as well as Armenia and Jordan, which start from similar levels of 
democracy but diverging levels of statehood. 
Against the regional trend 1: Failing authoritarian states? 
Another five ENC from the East and the South go against the regional trend in that they are 
marked by a decline in both dimensions of good governance: Belarus, Lebanon, Moldova, 
Morocco, and Tunisia score worse on both indicators of effective and democratic governance in 
2008 than they did ten years earlier, albeit to very different degrees. Especially regarding state 
capacity, the magnitude of change varies significantly, with only a minor decrease in the case of 
Morocco and Tunisia and a major decline in the cases of Belarus and Lebanon. Changes in the 
democratic quality vary to a much lesser degree. Lebanon is marked by only a slight 
deterioration of its democratic quality, while all other countries experience greater change. On 
average, the decline of GE goes hand in hand with a much bigger decrease of VA compared to 
the group of countries in line with the regional trend. Again, we see the same pattern of change 
at very different levels of democracy and statehood, but most countries in this group start from 
relatively high levels, especially of statehood, but also in some cases of democracy. Only 
Belarus departs from significantly lower levels of statehood and democracy so that the decrease 
in both dimensions brings the country to the very bottom of the ENC in 2008. Belarus and 
Moldova are the two countries where the trend towards less democracy and less statehood is 
most pronounced. Lebanon, by contrast, is marked by a major drop in state capacity, but the 
decrease of democratic quality well below the regional average and at a comparatively high 
level is negligible. As Morocco and especially Tunisia start from high levels of statehood and 
only experience a minor decrease in that dimension, they rather belong to the group of 
consolidating authoritarian states being in line with the trend rather than going against it.  
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Against the regional trend 2: Consolidating democratic states? 
Finally Algeria, Georgia, and Ukraine move into the same direction as Turkey and the Western 
Balkan countries, improving on both dimensions of effective and democratic governance. 
However, the initial levels and the magnitude of change of statehood and democracy vary 
significantly between the three countries. Algeria and Georgia make the biggest leap in terms of 
GE among the ENC, but show only little improvement on VA. For Ukraine, change in both 
dimensions is similarly small and its trajectory is thus much more even. While Algeria jumps up 
from extremely low levels of both statehood and democracy, Georgia and Ukraine start from 
similar and much higher levels before their trajectories diverge. 
In sum, the different patterns of change cut across the two (sub-)regions and show no 
systematic relation with the initial levels of democracy and statehood and the magnitude of 
change (table 2 and 3). Zooming into the European neighbourhood reveals significant variation 
across countries and more diverse variation over time than focusing on average scores of 
effective and democratic governance in the region suggests. If the EU and the ENP have an 
effect on (good) governance in its near abroad, it is clearly differential. How can we account for 
the three country patterns that cut across the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood? Are they 
the result of a differential treatment by the EU or do they rather reflect domestic developments? 
Table 2: Levels in the ENC 1998 (group 1, group 2, group 3) 
democracy 
statehood low medium high 
high -/- Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia -/- 
medium Egypt, Belarus Armenia, Georgia Moldova 
low Algeria, Azerbaijan, Syria Ukraine -/- 
 
Table 3: Magnitude of Change in the ENC 1998-2008 (group 1, group 2, group 3) 
democracy 
statehood small medium big 
big Algeria, Georgia, Lebanon Belarus -/- 
medium Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Syria Moldova -/- 
small Ukraine Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia -/- 
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4. EU External Governance – does it make a difference? 
The EU has developed a “one-size-fits-all” institutional framework for promoting good 
governance in its external relations with (neighbouring) countries (Börzel et al. 2007). The ENP 
brings together pre-existing policy frameworks which have, however, always relied on similar 
instruments and highly standardized provisions in line with the EU’s global policy on human 
rights, democracy, and good governance. Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA) 
in the South and Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in the East form the legal basis 
for political dialogue and democratic conditionality. The EU can provide capacity-building 
through various external cooperation programmes. The European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) has replaced the former (sub-)regional programmes TACIS and 
MEDA in 2007. In addition, the ENC are eligible to a number of thematic programmes such as 
the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR, 2000), Twinning (2003), and 
TAIEX (2006). The EU has never established a joint multilateral framework for all ENC. Instead, 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995) and more recently the Union for the Mediterranean 
(2008) co-exist with the Eastern Partnership (2009). 
While the EU has developed a common institutional framework, it treats countries differently in 
the implementation (Börzel et al. 2008). This differentiation can take place in the content and 
objectives of specific measures, for instance focussing in one country on the fight against 
corruption and in another country on the respect for human rights. More fundamentally, the EU 
adjusts the depth of bilateral relations as part of its political conditionality, using the exclusion 
and inclusion into its policy framework as sanctions and rewards vis-à-vis individual countries. 
Thus, Syria and Belarus, which can be considered as the “bad guys” of the ENC, are the only 
ones which are not fully integrated into the institutional framework of the ENP as a result of EU 
sanctions (negative ex-ante conditionality). Neither the EMAA negotiated with Syria in 2004 and 
renegotiated in 2008, nor the PCA signed with Belarus in 1995 are currently in force. Although a 
PCA was signed in 1995, it never entered into force due to the authoritarian backlash Alexander 
Lukashenko around 1996 (Mihalisko 1997).Similarly, the EU refused to sign the EMAA 
negotiated with Syria in 2004 because of the regime’s role in the Middle East conflict, and 
despite a renegotiation in 2008, the signature is still pending (European Commission 2008). 
Azerbaijan and Egypt score as low on statehood and democracy as Belarus and Syria, 
however, their PCA/EMAA with the EU are in force and they participate fully in the ENP. They 
have developed Action Plans with the EU and benefit from all forms of technical and financial 
assistance, including the TAEIEX and Twinning Programmes of the EU. This differential 
treatment cannot be explained by different trajectories because Syria, Egypt and Azerbaijan are 
in line with the regional trend of more statehood and less democracy while Belarus has declined 
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on both. So have Lebanon and Moldova without being downgraded in their relationship with the 
EU. 
The EU is as inconsistent in rewarding progress as it is in punishing the lack thereof. The two 
“poster children” of the ENC, Morocco and Ukraine, were the first neighbours that have been 
elevated by the EU moving bilateral relations beyond the standard institutional framework of the 
ENP. In 2008, the EU and Morocco adopted a joint document establishing Morocco’s “statut 
avancé” in Euro-Mediterranean relations and serving as a road map for cooperation, 
complementing the EMAA and the ENP AP. In a similar vein, the EU and Ukraine agreed in 
2009 on an “Association Agenda”, replacing the ENP AP in preparation of a new association 
agreement. Yet, despite the Orange Revolution in 2004/2005, Ukraine has not significantly 
progressed, neither with regard to statehood nor democracy. Nor has Morocco, which has 
rather regressed in both dimensions. Likewise, Georgia has made some significant progress in 
statehood but not in democracy but is treated by the EU and US as an anchor for democracy in 
Russia’s near abroad (van Hüllen and Stahn 2009). Other countries that also have substantially 
improved in statehood and at least not declined on democracy have not received similar 
rewards. Interestingly, Algeria is the ENC that has improved most in statehood and democracy 
since the late 1990s. At the same time, it is the only Southern ENC with an EMAA in force that 
has kept its distance to the ENP, refusing to engage in the benchmarking and monitoring 
exercise of ENP AP and progress reports (van Hüllen 2010).  
Overall there is no consistent differentiation of the EU’s approach on the basis of different levels 
of democracy and statehood or the direction and magnitude of change therein. While the EU 
might consider these factors for some countries, in other cases the EU’s differential treatment 
rather seems to be guided by geostrategic and economic interest, such as energy security in 
case of Azerbaijan (Börzel et al. 2008) and the (diverging) roles of Syria and Egypt in the Middle 
East Conflict. As we have already seen, the different country patterns of change do not 
correlate with particular levels of statehood and democracy either. Both the ENC in line with and 
going against the regional trend vary significantly in the effectiveness and democratic quality of 
their governance institutions (see above). Their trajectories are driven by domestic factors that 
are largely contingent and have hardly been influenced by the EU and its Neighbourhood 
Policy. In a first assessment of domestic developments and the EU’s role, we discuss the 
driving forces behind major changes in statehood (Algeria, Belarus, Georgia, Lebanon, and 
Moldova) and the significance of the rare improvements of democratic quality (Algeria, Georgia, 
Ukraine). 
The major decrease in government effectiveness in Lebanon is due to the resurgence of violent 
conflict in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Prime Minister of Lebanon, in 2005, 
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marked by the Israeli-Lebanese war in 2006 and domestic violence surrounding the succession 
of Michel Suleiman to Emil Lahoud as President in 2008. The situation in Moldova is similar. 
The frozen conflict over Transnistria, where a Russian minority seeks secession to join the 
neighbouring motherland, does not only challenge the monopoly of force of the Moldovan state 
but also undermines its overall stability. While the EU is certainly not responsible for the decline 
of statehood in the two countries, its attempts at conflict resolution in the context of the ENP 
have not made much of a difference either (Vahl and Emerson 2004). Conversely, Algeria 
significantly improved in statehood when the civil war ended in 2002 and (political) life slowly 
returned to normal over the following years. The EU had remained conspicuously passive after 
the 1992 coup interrupting the electoral process in Algeria, and negotiations for an EMAA with 
Algeria were only suspended temporarily in 1997-1999 in light of the political situation and in 
particular the increased violence (Hugh 2002). However, bilateral relations with the EU have 
strengthened again in the post-conflict period, with the conclusion of the EMAA in 2002 and 
increased capacity-building under MEDA, especially since 2004. The EU has certainly not 
played a major role in ending the civil war, allowing the Algerian regime to govern more 
effectively again, but it might have supported the process of slowly consolidating statehood. The 
influence of external actors on the increase of government effectiveness is more obvious in 
Georgia, where pressure and assistance by the EU and other donors supported the Saakashvili 
regime in its fight against corruption (Börzel and Pamuk 2011). Conversely, EU sanctions might 
have contributed to the loss in statehood of Belarus, even though this would have been an 
unintended consequence; the EU seeks to punish the low democratic quality of Belarusian 
governance institutions rather than undermine their effectiveness (van Hüllen and Stahn 2009). 
Turned positively, the Belarusian case could be interpreted as the absence of the EU’s 
otherwise positive impact, as Belarus does not benefit from similar levels of capacity-building 
and is excluded from several EU programmes such as TAIEX and Twinning. This would 
suggest that the EU indeed contributes to the overall positive trend for government 
effectiveness in the region, at least in those countries where it deploys its entire means at 
promoting effective governance and which do not face major challenges to statehood in the 
form of violent conflict. 
Increases in democracy in Algeria, Ukraine, and especially Georgia are very modest and clearly 
endogenously driven. For Algeria, the improvement at very low levels has to be placed against 
the background of the end of violent conflict around 2002. It has allowed the restoration of 
Algerian political institutions, including elections, which largely explains the improvements in 
democratic standards in Algeria. In addition, political rights and civil liberties are no longer 
overshadowed by the threat of domestic violence, reviving pluralism in media, civil society, and 
political participation. Algeria has been very cautious in actively engaging in the ENP, including 
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parts of the EU’s policy for promoting good governance (van Hüllen 2010), so the EU’s role is at 
best weak. The effect of the ENP on democratization in Ukraine and Georgia is equally weak 
and indirect. The democratization process in the Ukraine is endogenously driven. However, 
membership aspirations of pro-Western governments have made the EU an anchor for 
democratic reforms (Youngs 2009), at least until Viktor Yanukovych took office in 2010, which 
has resulted in a democratic relapse. Neither the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2003 nor the 
Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2004 have led to a democratic breakthrough and the EU has not 
succeeded in reinforcing or stabilizing the democratic momentum of the colour revolutions. 
5. Conclusion 
Despite its normative aspirations, the EU has sought to export security, stability and economic 
prosperity rather than democracy to its Southern and Eastern neighbours (Youngs 2001; 
Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2009; Börzel 2010). The ENP can be considered a success in this 
regards, at least until recently. With a few exceptions, the ENC have increased the 
effectiveness of their governance institutions. The stalling or recess of their democratic quality 
certainly contradicts the EU’s goal of democracy promotion, but might be an unintended 
consequence of prioritizing stability. In any case, the changes that go against this regional trend 
have been largely unrelated to the EU’s good governance promotion. Thus, if the ENP has a 
domestic impact, it appears to stabilize rather than transform existing governance institutions 
(Youngs 2001; Börzel 2010). While in the case of the CEEC, the EU has stabilized democracy, 
it has consolidated autocracy in the ENC. The recent break downs of the authoritarian regimes 
in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya happened less because but rather despite the EU’s attempts to 
prevent political instability producing negative externalities, such as uncontrolled migration or 
energy insecurity.  
It is far too early to tell whether the recent developments will reverse the regional trend in the 
Southern neighbourhood leading to more democracy; it certainly means less stability, at least in 
the short run. The current democratic uprisings stand in stark contrast to the regional trend 
towards consolidating authoritarian states in the European neighbourhood. Despite great hopes 
for political transformation after the end of the Cold War, the Eastern ENC got stuck in transition 
and recently experience a back sliding in democratic standards – not only in Belarus, but also in 
Ukraine and Georgia after the colour revolutions. It remains to be seen whether the break down 
of authoritarian regimes results in substantial and lasting democratic transitions ending the 
persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa. In any event, the ENP has 
little to do with the current changes in the Arab World. The refusal of the EU to impose sanction 
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on Libya amid the massive violence by which Gaddafi seeks to suppress the pro-democracy 
upheavals against his regime once again demonstrates the EU’s priority for stability over 
democracy. So does the attempt of the EU to come up with a coordinated response to the 
democratic changes in North Africa and the Middle East. While EU assistance shall focus on 
"deep democracy building", including electoral reform, support for civil society, construction of 
an independent judiciary and a free press and media, and the fight against corruption, the 
preparations for Tunisia seem to indicate that the EU is most likely to concentrate on effective 
rather than democratic governance, particularly in the area of economic development and 
border control (Phillips 2011). 
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